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Abstract
In this dissertation project, we describe and implement a practical system
application based on a selective disclosure credential scheme, namely the
Coconut credential scheme[1]. The specific application here is an electronic
petition system with the distinctive added feature of unlinkability as well as
anonymity: such that no information about the anonymous petition voter is
linkable back to the individual. In other words, there is no data leaked about
who voted in the petition, just that the users who did, were indeed eligible
and authorized to vote. As for the implementation, the client-side is done
using JavaScript so that the client can trustlessly compute the cryptographic
constructions individually, whereas the server-side is done using Node.js,
but can easily be replaced by a more sophisticated and secure structure such
as a permissionless blockchain platform.
Keywords: Privacy, Applied Cryptography, E-petition, Zero-knowledge Proofs, Se-
lective Disclosure Credential
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Introduction
Motivation and Goal
With the recent increased interest and research in applied cryptography and privacy en-
hancing cryptographic techniques, there has been significant innovation, however with
the implementations slightly lagging behind. After learning about these findings and
techniques over the year, I decided to create a specific implementation which relied on
a cryptographic approach, namely a selective disclosure credential system called Coconut
[1]. Selective disclosure credentials [2] [3] allow issuance of a specific credential (hav-
ing one or more attributes) to a user with the ability to unlinkably reveal or "show" said
credential at a later instance, for purposes of authentication or authorization. The system
provides the user the ability to also "show" specific attributes of that credential or a spe-
cific function of the attributes embedded in the credential; e.g. if the user has an attribute
x representing their age, let’s say x = 21, they can show that f(x) > 21 without revealing
x.
One of the benefits from this approach is that users can be authenticated based on a
credential while still preserving their anonymity. In other words, the user can be authenti-
cated but the credential cannot be linked back to the user. Specifically, this project covers
the application of an electronic petition system build on top of the Coconut credential
system. There are a number of electronic petition systems that are currently being devel-
oped, but none that proved to be really complete or ready to be used in practical, large
scale conditions. There were some implementations that try to make e-petition systems
more secure and anonymous through the use of blockchain systems[4][5][6][7] however
they were still missing the feature of unlinkability, which is how this system is more en-
compassing. The motivation behind needing this added feature is to help prevent petitions
from being vulnerable to corruption or interference and help provide a fairer result for
the participants. As seen with the situation and events happening in Barcelona, [8] such
a censorship-resistant feature would definitely be useful when authorities "seize[d] ballot
boxes" [9] ahead of the Catalan referendum. Hiding the metadata regarding who voted for
whom would definitely be useful in such a scenario. The only data which would be leaked
if at least one authority maliciously leaks it, is the data concerning who is eligible to vote,
as opposed to who actually voted. This should not happen in the case where all authorities
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are honest. Also, unlinkability makes the system more secure and private, even in the case
that all voters collude to try and breach a voter’s privacy (ie. perfect ballot secrecy). This
is because even if the vote is breached, there is no information about who this specific
vote belonged to in the first place.
Organization/Structure of the Review
This dissertation project revolves around the implementation of an e-petition scheme
based on the Coconut selective credential disclosure system and an additive ElGamal
homomorphic/threshold decryption system. We first go over a background of alternative
methods for e-petition schemes as well as previous implementation of selective disclosure
credential system, Tangerine [10]. Following that, we introduce a high-level overview
of the coconut architecture and go over a few notations and assumptions. Next, we go
through the Coconut system definitions and design coupled with an additive homomor-
phic encryption scheme for petition voting. Afterwards, we describe the system imple-
mentation of the e-petition in parallel with the system design proposed. The system im-
plementation mainly consists of a fully functional prototype in Javascript mainly so that
it is completely trustless and client/front-end is able to do their own cryptographic com-
putations in the browser. The back end is done in node.js but can very simply be replaced
by a more secure back-end such as a blockchain platform. Then, we go over some testing
and evaluation of the system implementation. Finally, we conclude the report and touch
upon future directions and work to be done.
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Background and Related Work
Alternate E-Petition Implementations
Traditional paper-based, physical voting systems are clearly not scalable and inherently
incorporate numerous centralized points of failure and limitations. For example, you must
trust numerous entities in the system not to leak data about you, plus you must trust that
the people in charge do not do anything malicious to interfere with the petition or even
prevent or censor people from voting (as in Barcelona [9]), etc. However, a transition to
digital voting systems undoubtedly opens the doors to significant security vulnerabilities,
risks, and limitations.
There have been many such applications in the past, however as of the time of writing,
there have not been which confidently solve the critical issues of at least security and pri-
vacy. Some attempts, such as the Virginia WINVote machine in 2015[11], have even failed
miserably and ended up being decommissioned as a result of the security assessment [12]
done which embarrassingly highlighted all of the security flaws and vulnerabilities of the
system.
Votebook[13], a permission blockchain system for voting implemented by New York
University, was an attempt to utilize the security of a blockchain system that resembles the
current physical system with voting booths/stations and paper results that actually back
the digital system on the blockchain. Their approach is a conservative one and favors
a trade-off of security and integrity over privacy and censorship-resistance. Of course
this is definitely legitimate approach in terms of security and reliability, however in some
cases, such as with the Barcelona situation mentioned above, [8] privacy and censorship-
resistance is crucial for the petition; especially when the police are "seiz[ing] ballot boxes"
[9] and trying to influence and censor the petition itself.
There have been numerous other electronic voting and petition schemes/systems which
are trying to leverage the blockchain security guarantees. However, as of the time of writ-
ing, to my knowledge, most feedback has been very skeptical with none of these systems
actually confidently being used in practice. Even though some systems claim to have "the
world’s first secure open-source online voting software," [7] in my opinion, there are still
many issues in terms of security, privacy, censorship, fairness and scalability which are
yet to be solved.
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Some of the current projects could actually benefit from adding a private creden-
tial scheme like Coconut to provide unlinkability for the users/voters. For example, the
Ethereum implementation of the Open Vote Network protocol [4] could benefit from
adding an extra credential step at the beginning of the system. The Open Vote Network
protocol is neat protocol where the tally of votes can be computed by anyone. Basically,
this is done by having all voting parties compute emphemeral keys based on each others
public keys and use that to cast their vote. Once they all cast their vote to the blockchain
(which is used essentially as a public immutable bulletin board), anyone (even a mere ob-
server) can just compute the tally of votes. This is done by multiplying all of the cast votes
together and because of the way the ephemeral keys are computed, the encryption cancels
out. Then, to get the actual tally number from that value (which is basically g
∑
vi where
the vi’s are the different votes), the discrete logarithm must be done using an exhaustive
search of possible outcomes (since the result is relatively small this can be done).
Tangerine Signature System Criticism
The Tangerine Signature System is a multi-authority selective disclosure credential sys-
tem that was previously used to implement an electronic cash system done by a fellow
UCL student, Jedrzej Stuczynski [10]. Even though the Tangerine system is similar to
the Coconut credential system [1], it exhibits two major flaws/limitations in terms of the
anonymity and unlinkability security properties. The first of them, relating to anonymity,
being the fact that there is no blinding of the secret value in the commitment. This is a
vulnerability in terms of security as the secret can be compromised by and active adver-
sary. Also, if two users request credentials on respectively the values m1 and m2 such
that m1 = m2, the issuing authorities learn that these two users requested credentials on
the same attribute by simply observing Cm1 = g
m1
1 = g
m2
1 = Cm2 ; this breaks blind
issuance. This may not be such a critical problem in some cases (such as the e-petition)
where the credential is a random value but in other cases where the credential is someone’s
age or name for example, it definitely is. To solve this problem, Coconut uses Pedersen
commitments which are unconditionally hiding, as done in the PrepareBlindSign step
of the Coconut implementation, namely replacing the commitment cm = gm1 by a blinded
commitment cm = gm1 h
o
1.
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The second vulnerability, concerning unlinkability, is the fact that in Tangerine’s pre-
pareForVerify step, matching showBlindSign or ProveCred of Coconut (depending on
which version of the Coconut paper used), does not include any randomness in the cre-
ation of κ. This is fundamental in preserving the user’s unlinkability against an active
or even passive adversary. The attack is similar to the one against blindness where if two
users have the same credentials on respectively the valuesm1 andm2 such thatm1 = m2,
they would have the same κm1 = αβ
m1 = αβm2 = κm2 . The solution implemented in
Coconut is adding randomness to change κ from κ = αβm to κ = αβmgr2. However, in
order to keep the bilinear pairing valid, another component ν = (h′)r had to be added,
which doesn’t pose any added non-negligible difficulties.
High-level overview of Coconut architecture
Coconut is “a selective disclosure credential system, supporting threshold credential is-
suance of public and private attributes, re-randomization of credentials to support multi-
ple unlinkable revelations, and the ability to selectively disclose a subset of attributes”[1].
The scheme is an extension of Pointcheval and Sander’s work, [14] which is essentially
a more efficient construction with the same properties of CL-signatures [2]. The main
contribution of the Coconut scheme is that it introduces threshold issuance.
request
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contract
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create functio of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. Th authorities set q = 1, and re expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
init
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bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
r fer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice dur g the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Cr te function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring t e user to prove i some ays that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this si nature acts as he citizen creden ials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an i stance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as he arithmetic ba kend. We hav released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the ean (µ) and standard d viation (
 
 2) of
the execut o of each procedur described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
N mber of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signatur on hidden m ssage:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the sche e on hidd n me sage ). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alber o: compare re ults (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initializ d t
zero). In the case of a petition the options are nly YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut whe deeply related to blo kchains), since w
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilin ar pairing works over a Barr to-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Op nSSL as the rithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - our project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSi n 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Pe formances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O( ) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange i volved in the sig ature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System valuation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n aut ority): lient
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind si natures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citize of C. Th authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this s gnature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaig . Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, ner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniqu ly identifies the petition, and
the scores paramet r holds the citizen’s vot s (initialized to
zero). In t e case of a petition the o tions ar only YES
and NO; a d the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add th ir vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built f om a sign d private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how th CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since w
actually built all of this to have redentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tl b [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clea message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O( ) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
present d in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
m ssage on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The h ghe t transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden me sage. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s a sociated with the message is pproximat ly
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n auth rity): lient
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compa results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overvi w of the CoCoNut petition architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Crea e function of he CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citize of C. T e authorities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind a d long- rm sig atur on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and -voting campa gn. Succ s ively, any third
party create a instance of the petition contract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifi s the p titi , and the
scores par m ter holds the citizen’s votes (initi liz d to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t optio s are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities i suing the
cred ntia s. I order to sign the petitio , the users compute
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate k y k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluatio
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSig 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perf rmances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h pr cedur d scrib d in section ection II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 m asured on an Octa- ore
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. Th s table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times fa ter for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in pract ce m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Upd te the above
3https://github.com/asonni o/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these tok t steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of M let im-
plies tha the adversary needs o c rrup at least t
auth rities for this att ck to happen. This pr p rty
also prev nts a si gle authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving -petition and e-
vot
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs th Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters , t are set accordingly, and re f
po t to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expe ting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
catio k y of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order t sig a petition, the users compute a value n as
foll ws:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th etitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
cred ntials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s th vote of t e us rs to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citiz to vote
twice during the same campaign (preven do ble spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
pr p rties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a s ngle au-
thority from cre ting arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the previo s example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs th Cr ate f nction of the CoC Nut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. T e authorities se q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and l ng-term sig atur on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature a ts as the citizen credentia s t ign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scor s) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and t fields owner and verifier respectiv ly hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign t e petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
k
1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowled e proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (pr vent double spending), while t e proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @Georg , Describe how the CoCoNut autho ities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as n open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the ean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the sch me working o clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operatio µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSi n 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
B in Sign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBli dSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
Agg gateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear mess ge:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O( ) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the commu icat on compl xity and the
size of e ch exchange involv d in the sign ture cheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing uthori ies (n), and ||m|| represent the size of the
message on which the u er wi h to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest tr nsaction siz appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it take to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alber o: disc ss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authoriti s in
charge of C runs the Create function of t e CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the use to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, a d are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citiz n credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the pe ition contra t as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifi , options, score ) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scor s) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case f a petition the opti ns a e only YES
and NO; and he fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, an build a zero-knowl dge proof showi g that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built fr m a signed private k y k.
C. Mapping authoriti s to bl ck ha n de
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut au horities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the ot nti l
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockcha ns), si ce we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primit ves evaluati n
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using t e two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear p iring works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] urve, using
OpenSSL s the rithm tic back nd. We have released the ode
as an op - ou c proj ct on GitH b.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described n ection section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (ab ut
15 times faster for the sch me workin on clea messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± .003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden m s age:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time f s er f r the scheme on hidden messag s). Also,
aggregation of key and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication co plexi y and t e
size of e ch exchange i volved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a si nature. Not
that in practice m is the hash of the actual messag , nd is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the pr of  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the abov
B. System evaluation
Alb rto: @Bano, test system o AWS ( authority): cli nt
latency v t – ask sig atures (and n blind signatures) and
check the t me it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Albert : compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many sc eme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a s t of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points t a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities s t q = 1, a d are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized t
zero). I the c se of a petiti n the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the pe ition and of
auth riti s i suing the crede tials. I order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value as f llows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during th same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   e sures
tha   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actu lly built all of this to have credenti ls in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for th scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authoriti s: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature n hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y sig ature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication omplexity and transactio size.
a d 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as t e number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
messag on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the h sh of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears wh n the ser
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alb rto: @Ba o, test ystem on AWS (n aut ority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed nd size) with alternativ s
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petitio architecture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Crea e function of he CoCoNut library.
The para eters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom fun tion equiring the use to prove in some ways that
he is a citiz n of C. The aut oritie t q = 1, an are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm igna ure on the citizen’s iv te
key k; this s gnature acts s the citiz c den ials to sign
any e-petition nd e-vot g campa gn. Succes ively, any hird
party create a instance of the petition contra t as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely i entifies t e p tition, and the
scores paramet r holds the citiz n’s votes (initializ d to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fields owner and k r spect vely h ld the public key of the
third party creating the p tition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and bu ld a zero-knowledg proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a B rreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measur s: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyg 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSi n 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Ra d ize 0.545 ± 0.002
V rify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: P rformances evaluation.
Numbe of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signat on clear mess ge:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v rify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
S g ature on hidden message:
  ask ignature O(n) 516
À get ignature O(n) 132
Ã verify sig atur O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Inte Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying sig atures (about
15 times f ster for the scheme wo king on cl ar messag s,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of ke s a d ignatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fi . 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in pract ce m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overvi w f th Mal t petition architecture
Bano: Re o his fig re as p r Ba o’s notes, nd then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these toke to ste l all the money
in the buffer. The threshold prop rty of Malet im-
plies that the adversary eeds to rrup at least t
auth ritie for this att ck to happen. This pr perty
also prev nts a si gl auth rity from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petiti n and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a cust m function req iring the users to prove
in some ways that they are citizens of C. The auth ri-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are exp cting to issue
a blind and long-ter signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen crede tials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields ow an vk resp c vely hold the verifi-
cation k y of th third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authoriti s issuing the credentials.
In orde to sign a p titio , the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part f a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vot of the us rs to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Proper ies brought by Malet. M let provides a set of
pr perties that enable th abov application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citize ’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the sers to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
throug the issuance phase only once, and can the
re-use their cre ent als multiple time while st ying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 C nso ship- sistant dist ibution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to th previou example, a of au horit es in
charge of C runs th Cre te func on of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set c ordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in s m ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, wner, verifier, options, sc res) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, sc r ) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options ar only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and ve ifier respectiv ly h ld
the public key of the third par y creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their v te to the options, app nd   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-k owledg proof showi g that   is
build from the same value x of their cr dentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen t vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain n des
Alberto: @George, Describ how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme h s been implem nt d i python
using the two cryp libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, usi g
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. W have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and st ndard devia ion (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop omputer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme workin on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Rand mize 0.545 ± 0.002
V rify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlin Sign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perform nces evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Trans ction complexity size [B]
Sig ature on clear mess ge:
  ask signature O(n) || ||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signat re on hidden me sa e:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity nd transaction size.
and 3 ime f s er for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficie t.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
present d in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
tha in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 byte (for SHA-2). The ize of a signatur is
132 bytes. The high st transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Ban , t st s stem on AWS ( authority): client
l tency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from a horities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is co l stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.co /asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen c edentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, y t i d party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, cor s) (1)
(UUID, own r, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniq ely id ntifie the petition, and
the scores parameter holds t e citizen’ votes (initi ized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the cre entials. In order to sign th petiti n,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, appe d   to a sp nt
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof sho ing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during th s me
campaign (prevent double sp nding), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, De cribe ho the C CoNut autho iti s
can also be Chainspace node (to make clear the pot ntial
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockcha ns), since w
actually built all of this to have cr dentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Nae rig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have eleas the ode
as an ope - ource project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard d viation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
Bli dSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBli dSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number f authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Tra saction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on idden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communic tion c mplexi y and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the sc eme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregatio of keys and signatures are xt emely efficient.
Table II shows the communication compl xity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The compl xity is expressed as the number
of signing author ties (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
m ssage on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
ther fore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated ith the message is approximately
318 bytes; th proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alb rto: pdate the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): cli nt
laten y vs t – ask n signa ures (and n blind signatures) an
che k the time it takes to hear back from t authoriti s.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have ac ually be n
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s ivate
key k; this signature acts as the citizen cr dentials to sign any
e-petition and e-vot ng campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifi r, options, cor s) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter olds th citizen’s votes (in tialized to
zero). In the ase f a petition the opti n are o ly YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respec ively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and f
authorities issuing the credentials. In order t si n the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vot to the options, app d   to a sp nt
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof s o ing that   is
build from the same value x f their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citiz n to vote wice during the same
campaign (prevent doub pend g), hile the proof   sur s
that   has been built from a signed private k y k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, De cribe ho the C CoNut author ties
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockcha ns), since w
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented n python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz I tel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
K yge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pre areBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: P rformance evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transactio complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signatur O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication c mplexity and tr nsaction size.
a 3 ti e fast r for th scheme on hid en mes ag s). Also,
ggregation of key and signature are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ang involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is express d as the nu ber
of signi g authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which t user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that n practice m s the hash of the actual message, and is
therefo set to 32 byt s (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the us r
ask signature o a hidden message. This comes from t fact
th the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alb rto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n bli d signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see w y it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
init
vote
Fig. 5: Overview of the C CoN t petitio architectur .
Similarly to the previous example, a set of auth rities in
charge of C runs the Cr a e function of he CoCo ut librar .
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref o nts to a
custom function requiring th user t prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The auth rities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- rm signatu e on th citizen’s priva
key k; this signature act as the citizen cr dentials to sign
any e-petition and -voting campa gn. Su ces iv ly, any third
party create a instance of the petitio co t ct as s ow in 5.
The UUID paramet r quely identifies th p tition, and the
scores parameter holds th citizen’s votes (initialized o z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options ar ly YES and NO; a d
the fields owner and k r spectively hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuin th
credentia s. In order to sign he petitio , the users compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, ap nd   to a sp
list L, and build a zero-kn wledge proof showing that   i
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has bee implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] nd bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works ver a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measu s: 10,000
Operation µ [m ]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyg n 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
Ag regateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pr pareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
S owBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
ggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Pe formances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature o clear messag :
  a k signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verif signat re O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature o hidden message:
  sk signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an op n-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the xecution of h procedure described in section sec ion II.
Each entr is the result of 10,000 measur d on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz I tel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster tha verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
and 3 time faster for th scheme o hid en messages . Also,
aggr gation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message n w ich the user wi h to obtai a signature. Note
that in ractice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transacti n size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden messa e. This omes from the fact
that the proof  s ass ciated with e m sage is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Bano’s not s, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold p op rty of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single uthority from taking t user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving -petiti n and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all th entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this s heme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citiz ns of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term sig ature on the itiz n’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition a d e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then ho will bl ndness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifie t e petition, and th score param ter
Bano: is t is private (can everyone see current sc res)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and th fields own r and vk respectively hold the verifi-
c tion key f th hird party creatin th petition and the
ver ficati key of the auth rities issuing the credentials.
In rder to sign a petition, the sers compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that is build fr the same valu k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petiti sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, nd checks hat the vote is fresh by verifying
that n i not part of a spe t l st L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
u to t li t L. Ad ng n to L prevents a citizen o vote
twice during the same campaign (pr vent double spend-
ing). Also, h proof p ens res that n has been built from
a signed private k y k; this means that th users correctly
xecuted the call ack to prove th t they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prev nts the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and u e it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resi tant syste based on
Malet. Proxies are of en used to circumvent censorship
when th target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from t ree limitatio . First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number f countries block Tor by blacklisti g Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
10
show
Figure 1: A high-level overview of the Coconut architecture, taken from Coconut paper [1]
As illustrated in figure 1 above, in the 1st t p the u er reque ts a credential from a
set of authorities. In the 2nd step, each authority issues the user with a partial creden-
tial which the user aggregates into a full credential (whe they have a threshold number
of shares) and randomizes in the 3 d step. Finally, in th 4th step, the user who o n
the credentials can selectively disclose attribut s or st tements about them in a publicly
verifiable protocol.
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The main objectives/design goals of this systems are to include threshold authorities,
provide blind issuance and unlinkability, exhibit non-interactivity, liveness, and efficiency,
using short credentials no matter the number of authorities or the number of attributes
embedded in the credential.
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Notations and Assumptions
Zero Knowledge Proofs
As described in Coconut[1], the system uses non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to
assert knowledge and relations over discrete logarithm values. The notation used to rep-
resent them is the one introduced by Camenisch et al [15] as shown below:
NIZK{(x, y, . . . ) : statements about x, y, . . . }
Note that all zero knowledge proof used are based on standard sigma protocols to
show knowledge or representation of discrete algorithms. They are based on the DL
assumption [15] and can be done without a trusted setup.
Security Settings
In addition, as detailed in Coconut[1], the system requires groups (G1,G2,GT ) of prime
order p with a bilinear map e : G1 × G2 → GT which satisfies the following properties:
bilinearity, non-degeneracy, efficiency, and we use type 3 pairings which rely on the XDH
(External Diffie-Hellman) Assumption, which in turn implies the difficulty of the co-
CDH (Computational co-Diffie-Hellman) problem as well as the DDH (Decisional Diffie-
Hellman) problem. In addition, DDH is only guaranteed in G1 and we would need to rely
on the SXDH assumption (which is stronger) if we also want DDH in G2[16].
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Coconut System Design
Scheme Definitions
The protocols that comprise the Coconut threshold credentials scheme are defined below
as described in the Coconut paper[1]:
v Setup(1λ)→ (params): defines the system parameters params with respect to the
security parameter λ. These parameters are publicly available.
v KeyGen(params)→ (sk, vk): run by the authorities to generate their secret key sk
and verification key vk from the public params.
v AggKey(vk1, . . . , vkt)→ (vk): run by whoever wants to verify a credential to ag-
gregate any subset of t verification keys vki into a single consolidated verification key
vk. AggKey needs to be run only once.
v IssueCred(m,φ)→ (σ): Interactive protocol between a user and each authority, by
which the user obtains a credential σ embedding the private attribute m satisfying the
statement φ.
v AggCred(σ1, . . . , σt)→ (σ): run by the user to aggregate any subset of t partial
credentials σi into a single consolidated credential.
v ProveCred(vk,m, φ′)→ (Θ, φ′): run by the user to compute a proof Θ of posses-
sion of a credential certifying that the private attribute m satisfies the statement φ′
(under the corresponding verification key vk).
v VerifyCred(vk,Θ, φ′)→ (true/false): run by whoever wants to verify a credential
embeding a private attribute satisfying the statement φ′, using the verification key vk
and cryptographic material Θ generated by ProveCred.
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Coconut Credential Scheme (specific to e-petition)
This scheme is briefly described in the the applications section of the Coconut paper[1]
and can be seen as an extension of the work of Diaz et al [17] which does not consider
threshold issuance of credentials. The below scheme is taken from the Coconut paper[1]
however with slight modifications on the part of φ and φ′ to make it specific to the e-
petition.
It is important to clarify that the issuance of the credential happens only once, while
the rest of the scheme can happen as many times as needed. The user must only randomize
the credential and continue with the rest of the system scheme normally (basically starting
at the ProveCred stage and continuing as usual every time the user wants to re-use the
credential).
v Setup(1λ)→ (params): Choose a bilinear group (G1,G2,GT ) with order p, where
p is a λ-bit prime number. Let g1, h1 be generators of G1, and g2 a generator of G2.
The system parameters are params = (G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2, h1).
The Setup algorithm generates the public parameters. Credentials are elements ofG1,
while verification keys are elements of G2.
v TTPKeyGen(params, t, n)→ (sk, vk): Pick two polynomials v, w of degree t− 1
with coefficients in Fp, and set (x, y) = (v(0), w(0)). Issue to each authority i ∈
[1, . . . , n] a secret key ski = (xi, yi) = (v(i), w(i)), and publish their verification key
vki = (g2, αi, βi) = (g2, g
xi
2 , g
yi
2 ). In addition, TTPKeyGen can be distributed using
techniques of Gennaro et al. [18] or Kate et al. [19] (as in the Coconut paper[1]).
v IssueCred(m)→ (σ): Credentials issuance is composed of three algorithms:
v PrepareBlindSign(m)→ (d,Λ): The users generate an El-Gamal key-pair (d, γ =
gd1); pick a random o ∈ Fp, compute the commitment cm and the group element
h ∈ G1 as follows:
cm = g
m
1 h
o
1 and h = H(cm)
Pick a random k ∈ Fp and compute an El-Gamal encryption of m as below:
c = Enc(hm) = (gk1 , γ
khm)
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Output (d,Λ = (γ, cm, c, pis)), where pis is defined by:
pis = NIZK{(d,m, o, k) : γ = gd1 ∧ cm = gm1 ho1
∧ c = (gk1 , γkhm) ∧ φ(m) = 1}
To keep an attribute m ∈ Fp hidden from the authorities, the users use a blinding
factor o to keep it blind from adversaries who would try expected values of m. Then
the users encrypt it with their El-Gamal secret key so that the authorities are able to
blindly sign the credential. They must also include a zero-knowledge proof ensuring
correctness of γ, cm, c
v BlindSign(ski,Λ, φ) → (σ˜i): The authority i parses Λ = (γ, cm, c, pis), ski =
(x, y), and c = (a, b). Recompute h = H(cm). Verify the proof pis using γ, cm and
φ; if the proof is valid, build c˜ = (ay, hxby) and output σ˜i = (h, c˜); otherwise output
⊥ and stop the protocol.
To blindly sign the attribute, each authority i verifies the proof pis, and uses the
homomorphic properties of El-Gamal to generate an encryption c˜ of hxi+yi·m as
below:
c˜ = (ay, hxibyi) = (gkyi1 , γ
kyihxi+yi·m)
Note that every authority must operate on the same element h. Intuitively, generating
h from h = H(cm) is equivalent to computing h = gr˜1 where r˜ ∈ Fp is unknown by
the users (as in Pointcheval and Sanders) And since h is deterministic, every party is
able to derive it in isolation.
v Unblind(σ˜i, d) → (σi): The users parse σ˜i = (h, c˜) and c˜ = (a˜, b˜); compute
σi = (h, b˜(a˜)
−d). Output σi.
Upon reception of c˜, the users decrypt it using their El-Gamal private key d to recover
the partial credentials σi = (h, hxi+yi·m)
v AggCred(σ1, . . . , σt)→ (σ): Parse each σi as (h, si) for i ∈ [1, . . . , t]. Output
(h,
∏t
i=1 s
li
i ), where l is the Lagrange coefficient:
li =
 t∏
i=1,j 6=i
(0− j)
 t∏
i=1,sj 6=i
(i− j)
−1 mod p
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The users then aggregate any subset of t partial credentials. This algorithm uses the
Lagrange basis polynomial l which allows to reconstruct the original v(0) and w(0)
through polynomial interpolation;
v(0) =
t∑
i=1
v(i)li and w(0) =
t∑
i=1
w(i)li
However, this computation happens in the exponent—neither the authorities nor the
users should know the values v(0) and w(0). One can easily verify the correctness of
AggCred of t partial credentials σi = (hi, si) as below.
s =
t∏
i=1
(si)
li =
t∏
i=1
(
hxi+yi·m
)li
=
t∏
i=1
(hxi)li
t∏
i=1
(hyi·m)li =
t∏
i=1
h(xili)
t∏
i=1
h(yili)·m
= hv(0)+w(0)·m = hx+y·m
v ProveCred(vk,m, σ, ζ)→ (Θ, ζ): Parse σ = (h, s) and vk = (g2, α, β). Pick at
random r′, r ∈ F2p; set σ′ = (h′, s′) = (hr
′
, sr
′
); build κ = αβmgr2, ν = (h
′)r
and ζ = gms , where this identifier is generated through a hash function on the petition
identifier Fp → G1 : H˜(s) = gs | s ∈ Fp. Output (Θ = (κ, ν, σ′, piv), ζ), such that piv
is:
piv = NIZK{(m, r) : κ = αβmgr2 ∧ ν =
(
h′
)r ∧ ζ = gms }
Before verification, the verifier collects and aggregates the verifications keys of the
authorities—this process happens only once and ahead of time. First, the users ran-
domize the credentials by picking a random r′ ∈ Fp and computing σ′ = (h′, s′) =
(hr
′
, sr
′
); then, they compute κ and ν from the attribute m, a blinding factor r ∈ Fp
and the aggregated verification key:
κ = αβmgr2 and ν = (h
′)r
Finally, they send Θ = (κ, ν, σ′, piv) and ζ to the verifier where piv is a zero-knowledge
proof asserting the correctness of κ and ν; and that the private attribute m embedded
16
into σ satisfies ζ = gms . The proof piv also ensures that the users actually know m and
that κ has been built using the correct verification keys and blinding factors.
v VerifyCred(vk,Θ, ζ)→ (true/false): Parse Θ = (κ, ν, σ′, piv) and σ′ = (h′, s′);
verify piv using vk and ζ. Output true if the proof verifies, h′ 6= 1 and e(h′, κ) =
e(s′ν, g2); otherwise output false.
The pairing verification is similar to Pointcheval and Sanders [14] and Boneh et
al[16]; expressing h′ = gr˜1 | r˜ ∈ Fp, the left-hand side of the pairing verification can be
expanded as:
e(h′, κ) = e(h′, g(x+my+r)2 ) = e(g1, g2)
(x+my+r)r˜
and the right-hand side:
e(s′ν, g2) = e(h′(x+my+r), g2) = e(g1, g2)(x+my+r)r˜
From where the correctness of VerifyCred follows.
The main difference between this specific e-petition Coconut credential scheme and
the generic Coconut credential scheme described in the Coconut paper[1], which can
be found in the appendix Coconut Generic Scheme section, is that the φ parameter in
PrepareBlindSign is simply equal to 1 and can be ignored because it’s not needed and
φ′(m) = 1 parameter in ProveCred and VerifyCred is implemented as ζ = gms =
H∗(s)m which is specific to the e-petition and basically prevents users from voting mul-
tiple times (also known as the double spend problem). Everything else is essentially the
same.
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Signature Petition Scheme
The signature petition scheme implemented here is one consisting of an additive homo-
morphic encryption system along with a threshold decryption technique on the encrypted
result.
Once the the user’s credentials are verified, the user will be elligible to participate in
the petition voting. To optimize, it is done in parallel with the ProveCred and Verify-
Cred protocols above. The vote output is sent along with the ProveCred output. At the
authority’s side, if the VerifyCred is valid (credential valid and there is no double spend
attempt), then they continue with the rest of the vote procedure.
In this system, there are 3 types of parties, the voters/users, the decrypting authori-
ties, and the petition entity (owner/creator). Note that these decrypting authorities are not
necessarily the same as the signing authorities in the previous Coconut procedure. Tech-
nically for simplicity, authorities can perform both signing and decrypting functions but
they do not neccessarily have to be merged at all. Firstly, the authorities generate their
El-Gamal keypairs (d, γ = gd) = (secret key: sk, verification key: vk), and publish their
respective public verification keys.
The users then collect and aggregate the El-Gamal public keys of the the authorities.
For simplicity here, we use an n-out-of-n credentials system with regards to the multiple
authorities.
γagg = (
N−1∏
i=0
γi)
In addition to this, the authorities must provide a NIZK proof of the secret correspond-
ing to the public key. This is done mainly to prevent a malicious rogue public key attack
[20] whereby the malicious actor eve broadcasts a fake public key they when the aggre-
gated with the rest, produces a key that is actually the real public key of the malicious
actor, as shown below:
γfake = γeve · (
N−1∏
i=1
γi)
−1
Then, when aggregated with the rest of the public keys, the aggregated key will pro-
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duce the following:
γagg = (
N−1∏
i=0
γi) = γfake · (
N−1∏
i=1
γi) = γeve · (
N−1∏
i=1
γi)
−1 · (
N−1∏
i=1
γi) = γeve
The consequences of this attack are that the group’s public key would then be in
control of the attacker Eve. Authorities then provide a NIZK proof of knowledge of the
secret key to the public key they publish to prevent this attack from occurring:
piγ = NIZK{(d) : γ = gd}
Once the users have the aggregated verification key, they El-Gamal encrypt their vote
v with the aggregated verification key.
choose random k ∈ Fp
enc(vi) = (g
k, γkagg · hvi) = (a, b)
An important thing to note is that since the vote is encrypted and only viewable by the
voter themselves, a problem arises being that a mallicous voter can encrypt an arbitrary
vote to adversarily affect the outcome. To circumvent this, a zero-knowledge proof pip is
added to ensure that the vote v is either 0 or 1, namely v(v − 1) = 0, such that:
pip = NIZK{(v, k) : c = (gk, γkagg · hv) ∧ v(1− v) = 0}
(Exactly how this is done is detailed in the Scheme Implementation section below)
Note the following two points. First, this NIZK proof does not prevent blank votes
(ie. 0-0 or 1-1). Second, that we also include the encryption of the vote inverse for
clarity/simplicity reasons, so that we get a total of 1 votes and 0 votes when we decrypt
even though the inverse of the vote can be derived from the vote as done with the Coconut
implementation in Python[21]. Then the users send that to the petition entity
encnot(vi) = (a
−1, b−1 · h) = (g−k, γ−kagg · h−vi · h) = (g−k, γ−kagg · h1−vi)
The user then sends all of this information, (enc(vi), encnot(vi), pip) to the petition
entity.
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The petition entity then homomorphically adds the encrypted votes by simply multi-
plying them together, N being the total number of voters.
enc(total(v)) =
N−1∏
i=0
enc(vi) = (
N−1∏
i=0
a,
N−1∏
i=0
b) = (
N−1∏
i=0
gki ,
N−1∏
i=0
(γkiagg · hvi))
= (g
∑N−1
i=0 ki , γ
∑N−1
i=0 ki
agg · h
∑N−1
i=0 vi) = (gkagg , γ
kagg
agg · h
∑N−1
i=0 vi) = (a˜, b˜)
Similarly, for encnot(vi) we get:
enc(totalnot(v)) =
N−1∏
i=0
encnot(vi) = (g
kagg , γ
kagg
agg · h
∑N−1
i=0 (1−vi)) = (a˜not, b˜not)
After the petition has ended, to get the actual results from the total encyrpted result,
the petition entity must send this total to the decrypting authorities who jointly decrypt
the total with their secret key one by one:
total(v) = (a˜, b˜ · a˜−di)
(And similarly for totalnot(v))
Once the last decrypting authority has jointly decrypted, the result will look like this:
total(v) = (a˜, h
∑N−1
i=0 vi)
totalnot(v) = (a˜, h
∑N−1
i=0 (1−vi))
Then all the last decrypting authority has do to get actual result would be to calculate
the discrete logarithm of htotal. Discrete logarithm computations are usually very tough
to do, however in this case it should not be too hard since we know that all values must be
either 0 or 1 and we can compute hi for possible outcome values of i until hi = htotal.
It works because in this case, total is a small enough value for this to be done.
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System Architecture and Implementation
Starting Points
Fork of JavaScript E-Cash Tangerine Implementation
For the implementation of this project, the starting point was to fork the repository[22]
of a previous fellow UCL master’s student, Jedrzej Stuczynski, who implemented a multi
authority selective disclosure credential system for an e-cash scheme. His implementa-
tion was based on the Tangerine Signature System, which exhibited some shortcomings
in terms of security and privacy when compared to Coconut, discussed in greater detail
in the Tangerine Signature System Criticism section. Accordingly, his implementations
included these flaws/limitations, and are addressed below.
The first step to beginning this project from the forked repository, was to remove
unneeded aspects/components such as the extra coin credentials (value, TTL, ID). The
next step was to fix these issues and limitations. Once I had done that, I could continue
from that starting point to implement the rest of the system onward from the IssueCred
step, since the rest of the design/implementation is different.
Criticism of Previous Implementation
Even though Jedrzej’s implementation was on the most part very properly done, it still
exhibited some flaws that are worth nothing but most importantly had to be dealt with.
First of all, the commitment to the secret credential did not include any blinding factor
as mentioned above in the Tangerine Signature System Criticism section, which is detri-
mental to the security of the system. In addition, the implementation of the commitment
was done in the groupG2 using the generator g2. This was changed to be done in the group
G1 using the generator g1. The system still worked with the computations/constructions in
G2, however they incurred an unneeded extra cost/overhead. This extra cost/overhead in-
cludes the fact that the commitment, credentials, and encryptions are unnecessarily twice
as large. Moreover, arithmetic operations (ie. point addition and scalar multiplication)
are more expensive (twice as much) in G2. This is illustrated more in the Testing and
Evaluation section.
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Furthermore, the implementation did not include a zero-knowledge proof for the El-
Gamal secret key of the client, the random k used in this encryption, and for the blinding
factor o, obviously because it was not even in the system design to begin with.
Scheme Architecture
The architecture consists of 3 different types of parties, the client/user, the signing author-
ities, and the petition owner/creator(s), as can be seen in figure 2 below. Note that the
ledger is acts as a layer in between citizen/user and petition creator/owner communica-
tions.
vote
Ledger
petition 
creator
citizen
proof of identity 
authorities
smart 
contract
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petition 
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7
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold pro rty f Mal t im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money an disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What properties are expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the scenario where a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
and the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
c n also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut wh n deeply el ted to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Ran omize 0.545 ± 0.002
V rify 6.714 ± 0.005
Prepar BlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication co plexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complex ty i expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency s t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, wner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter u iquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge pr of showing that   is
build from the same value x f their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has b en built from a signed private key k.
C. Mappi g authoriti s to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
s an ope - ourc pr ject on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each ntry is the r sult of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing i much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the schem working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get s gnature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ag regation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish t obtain a s gnature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size app s when th user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (s eed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, optio s, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has be n built from a s gned private key k.
C. Mappi g uthoriti s to bloc chain nod s
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blo kchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The sig ature scheme has been imp ement d in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-sour project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) nd standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of eac procedure described in s ction section II.
Each entry is the esult of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying sig atures (about
15 times f ster for the schem working n clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggre ate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
lindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden m sages). Also,
ggregation of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc eme, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 byt s; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Albert : discuss crypto relat d works
Alberto: compare results (speed nd size) with alternatives
to see why it is co l st ff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of the CoCoNut petition architectur .
Similarly to the previous example, set of autho ities i
charge of C runs the Cr a function of he CoCoNut lib ary.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citiz f C. The aut orities et q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- m signature on the citizen’s p ivate
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting campa gn. Succes ively, any third
p rty create a instance f the petiti n contract as s own in 5.
The UUID parameter un quely identifies the p titio , and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initializ d to z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES and NO; and
the fie ds owner nd k respectiv ly hold the public key of the
third party creating the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In order to sign the petitio , the users compute a
value   follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spe t
list L, and build a zero-knowl dge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x f their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has be n built from a signed pri ate k y k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
c n also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contra ts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Prepar BlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Sign ture on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidd n message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows th mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
he execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working n clear messages,
and 3 tim faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II sh ws the communicatio complexity and the
size f each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
mes ge on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transactio size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition arch tect re
Bano: Re o this fi ure as per Ba o’s notes, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these token to steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Malet im-
plies that the adversary needs to corrup at least t
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in thi use
case. What properties are xpected from this scheme?
In this xample, we consid r the scenario w ere a
city C wish to issue some long term credentials to their
citizens in order to allow any third party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anonymous, and unlinkable across campaigns. This
system is based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in charge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom function requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve checking some other information e.g. passport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party creates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
an the fi lds owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key f the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the authorities issuing the credentials.
In order to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they construct a zero-knowledge proof showing
that n is build fr the same value k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th petitio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and checks that the vote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the users to the list of scores and adds
nu to t list L. Adding n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twi e during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Al o, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a si ned private k y k; this means that the users correctly
executed the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the cit zen’s s cret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple time a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based on
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been blocked, but prox-
ies suffer from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
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Similarly to the pr vious example, a set f authoriti s in
charge of C runs the Create fu cti n of th CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, nd ref oints to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as th citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting c mpaign. Suc ssively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, v ri ier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owne , vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add thei vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of th ir credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen t vot twic during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has bee built from a signed riv te key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme h s b en implem nt d in python
using the two crypo libr ries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I sho s the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 ti es faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances valuation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify si nature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
a d 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregat on of keys and signatures are extrem ly effic ent.
Table II s ows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange inv lved in the signatur scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| repres nts he size of the
messag on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that i practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
t refore set to 32 bytes (f r SHA-2). The size of a signa ure is
132 bytes. The highest transact o siz appears when the ser
ask a signature on a hidden message. This omes from t e fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t au orities.
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Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
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Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on th citiz ’s private
key k; this signature acts as th citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting camp ign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the p tition contr ct as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectiv ly hold
the public key of t e third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double sp nding), while the proof   nsures
that   has been built from a signed priv te k y k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe h w the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make cl ar the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply relat d t blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have cred ntials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster th n verifying signatures (about
15 times fas er for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
  [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performa ces evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Tran ction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) || ||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity nd transaction size.
and 3 time fas er for the sche e on idden me sages). A so,
aggregation of k ys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Tabl II shows th communication complexity nd the
size of ach xch nge involved in the signature sc eme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the umber
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the us r wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the has of the actual message, a d is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
late cy vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
ch ck the time it takes to hear back fr m t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: c mpare re ults ( peed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the prev ous example, a set of authoriti s in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoC Nut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring the user to prove in some ways that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scor s) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creating the petition and of
authorities iss ing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to t op ions, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-k owledge proof showing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent a citizen to vot twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   sures
that   has been built from s gned private key k.
C. Map ing authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @G orge, Describ h w th C CoNut uthorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply relat d o blockchains), sinc we
actually built al of this to have cr dentials in smar c t acts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic ackend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much f st r than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the sche e working on clear m ssag s,
Number of m asures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
Sh wBlind i 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evalu tion.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear me sage:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden m ssage:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 time faster for th scheme on hidden messages). Also,
ggregation of key nd signatures are extre ly efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size o each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expr ssed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| repres nts the size of t e
message on which the user wi h to obtain a ignature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size f a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it s cool stuff; not many scheme have a tually been
3https://github.com/as nnino/coconut
init
vote
Fig. 5: Overvi w of the CoCoNut pe ition a chi cture.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of aut rities in
charge of C runs the Crea funct n of he CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t a se acco di gly, and ref points to
custom function equiring the user to prove in so e ways that
he is a citizen f C. The authorit es e q = 1, and are ex e ting
to issue a blind and long- r sign ture on th citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voti g campa gn. Suc es ively, any third
party create a insta e of the p iti n co tract as own in 5.
The UUID parameter u quely identifi s the p ition, and the
scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (in tialized t z ro).
In the case of a peti ion t e options are only YES nd NO; and
the fields owner a d k respecti ly hold the public key of the
third party creating the etition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. In ord r to sig the petitio , the us r compute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showi g that   is
build from the sa e v lue x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen t vote twice during the same
camp ign (preve t double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed pri at key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @Georg , Descr be how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluatio
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo librar e p tlib [1] a d bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing w rks over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
R ndomiz 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Perform nces evaluation.
Numb r of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signa ure on hidd n m ssage:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunicatio complexity and tr nsaction size.
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) nd t nd rd deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure describ d in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 m asured on an Oct -cor
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than ve ifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on cl ar messag ,
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden message ). Al o,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), a d ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefore set to 32 bytes (for SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
Figure 5: Overview of the Malet petition architecture
Bano: Re o thi figur as per Ba o’s not s, and then
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and us hese token o steal all the money
in the buffer. The threshold property of Mal t im-
plies that the adversary nee s to corrup at least
authorities for this attack to happen. This property
also prevent a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear withou issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Privacy-preserving e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the entities involved in this use
case. What pr perties are expec ed from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the s enario where a
city C wish to issue s me long term credentials to their
citizens in o der to llow any th rd party to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or -voting campaign; all
citizens of C are allowed to participate, and should re-
main anon mous, and unlinkable acro s c mpaig s. This
system s based on the Malet library contract and a sim-
ple smart contract called p tition.
Similarly to the previous example, a set of authorities
in ch rge of C runs the Create function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and re f
points to a custom fu ction requiring the users to prove
in some ways that they are a cit zens of C. The authori-
ties set q= 1 Bano: what is q, and are expecting to issue
a blind and ong-term signature on the citizen’s priva e
key k; his sig ature acts as the citizen cred ntials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting Ban : state if this may in-
volve checking some other information .g. passpor off-
band, but th n how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessiv ly, any third party cr ates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as shown i fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, and the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
a d the fields owner and vk respectively hold the verifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verification key of the thoriti s issuing the credentials.
In order to sig a petition, the users compute a value n as
f llow :
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, t ey construct a zer -knowl dge proof showing
that n is build fr the same v lue k of their credentials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th pet tio sm rt contract checks the proof p and the
credentials, and c cks that the vote is fres by v rifying
that n i not part of a spent list L; if ll the check pass, it
ad s th vote of the users to the list of scores and add
nu to t list L. Addin n to L prevents a citizen to vote
twice during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, the proof p ensures that n has been built from
a sign d private key k; this means that the users correctly
ex cuted the callback to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their behave. Also, it allows the users to vote
anonymously.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across campaigns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: distributing the credentials issuance re-
moves a central authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
multiple ti a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We implement a censorship-resistant system based o
Malet. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address s bee blocke , but prox-
ies suffer from three limitatio s. First, proxies tend t
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of countries block Tor by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
10
smart 
contract
Ledger
petition 
creator
citiz n
7
Sim larly to he pr vious example, a s t of authorities i
charge of C runs t e Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The parameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref points to a
custom fu ction requiring th user to pr ve in some ways that
he is a itizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, nd ar expecting
to issue a blind and lo g-term signature on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as th citiz credential to ign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create n instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, wner, vk, (2)
opti ns, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifies the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the case of a petition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner and verifier respectively hold
the public key of t e third party creating the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as follows.
  = gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof sh wing that   is
build from the same value x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spending), while the proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alb rto: @Geor e, Describ how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potenti l
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to h v credentials in smart contracts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evalua i
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two c ypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard devi tion (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each ntry is the res lt of 10,000 measured on an Octa-co e
Del de ktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear essages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
Ag regateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Rando ize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances evaluation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature siz : 132 [B]
Transaction co plexity size [B]
Signature o clear m ssage:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get sign ture O( ) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidd n message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v rify signature O(1 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity a transaction size.
and 3 time faster for the scheme on hidden messag s). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The complexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the er wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practic m is the hash of the actual message, and i
therefore set to 32 bytes (f r SHA-2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s a sociated with the message is approximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to the previo s x mple, a set of authorities in
ch ge of C runs th Create function of th CoCoNu library.
The parameters n, t are set accordin ly, and ref points to a
custom function requiring he user to prove in ome ways that
he is a c tizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and long-term signature o the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the itizen credentials to sign any
e-petition and e-voting campaign. Successively, any third party
create an instance of the petition contract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, optio s, scores) (1)
(UUID, owner, vk, (2)
options, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID parameter uniquely identifi s the petition, and
the scores parameter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to
zero). In the cas of a petition the options are o ly YES
and NO; and the fields own r and verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party cr a ng the petition and of
authorities issuing the credentials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as f llows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the options, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zer - nowledge proof showi g that   is
build from the s me v ue x of their credentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
Adding to L prevent a citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (pr vent double spending), while he proof   ensures
that   has been built from a signed private key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, D scribe h w the CoCoN t authorities
can also be Chains ace n d s (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNu when deeply related to blockchains), nce w
actually buil all of this to have credentials in smart contr cts.
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signatu e scheme has been implemented in python
using the tw crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. Th
biline r pairing w rks ver a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Op nSSL a t arithm tic backe . We have released the code
as an ope - ourc project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the ean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the xecution of each procedur described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table show
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomiz 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performances valuation.
Number of authorities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transa tion complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signatur O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and transaction size.
and 3 t me faster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signatures are extremely efficient.
Table II shows the c mmunica ion complexity and the
size of e ch exchange involved in the signature sche e, as
presented in fig. 1. Th complexity is expressed as the number
of sig i g aut o ities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
m s age on wh ch the u er wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
therefor se to 32 byte (for SHA-2). Th size f a sign ture is
132 bytes. The highest transaction ize appears when the user
ask a sig ature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s associated with th messag is approximat ly
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n authority): client
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it t kes to hear back fr m t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto relate works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why t is cool stuff; not many scheme have actu lly been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Similarly to he previous example, a set of authorities in
charge of C runs the Create function of the CoCoNut library.
The p rameters n, t are set accordingly, and ref poi ts to a
custom function requiring the ser to pr ve in ome w ys that
he is a citizen of C. The authorities set q = 1, and are expecting
to issue a blind and l ng-term signatur on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credent als to si n any
e-petition and e-voti campaign. Successive y, any third party
crea e an instance of the petition co tract as shown in ??.
(UUID, owner, verifier, options, scores) (1)
(UUID, ow e , vk, (2)
ptions, scores) (3)
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
(4)
The UUID p am t r uniq ely identifies th petition, and
the scores param ter holds the citizen’s votes (initialized t
zero). In the case of a p tition the options are only YES
and NO; and the fields owner nd verifier respectively hold
the public key of the third party creatin the petition and f
authorities issuing the cred ntials. In order to sign the petition,
the users compute a value  as foll ws.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, t ey add their vote to opti ns, appen   to a spent
list L, and build a zer -knowledge proof showing th t   is
build from the same value x of their cr dentials:
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UUID     =   k}
dding   to L pr vent citizen to vote twice during the same
campaign (pr vent double s endi g), while the proof   sur s
that   s been built from a signed privat key k.
C. Mapping authorities to lockchain nodes
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of t is to have cr dentials in smart contract .
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluation
The signature scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries petlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Na hr g [17] curv , using
OpenSSL as the arithmetic backend. We have releas d the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) and standard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of each procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell desktop computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much faster than verifying signatures (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear messages,
Number of measures: 10,000
Operati n µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keyge 2.392 ± .006
Sign 0.445 ± .001
Aggregate ign 0.004 ± . 00
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
PrepareBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSi n 0.454 ± 0.000
TABLE I: Performan es e aluati .
Number of aut orities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Tra saction complexi y size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get ignature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  as signature O(n) 516
À get signature O(n) 132
Ã v ri y signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: Communication complexity and tra saction size.
and 3 time faster f r th scheme on hidde messages). Als ,
ggrega ion of key and signatures are extre ly efficient.
Tab e II shows the communication complexity and the
size of each exc ange involved in the signature sc me, as
presented in fig. 1. The co plexity is expressed as the number
of signing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents the size of the
message on which the user wish to obta n a signature. Note
that in practice m is the hash of the actual message, and is
ther fore set to 32 bytes (for SH -2). The size of a signature is
132 bytes. The highest transaction size appears when the user
ask a signature on a hidden message. This comes from the fact
t at the proof   associated with the message is pproximately
318 bytes; the proof  v is only 157 bytes.
Alberto: Update the above
B. System evaluation
Alberto: @Bano, test system on AWS (n auth rity): cl ent
latency vs t – ask n signatures (and n blind signatures) and
check the time it takes to hear back from t authorities.
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
Alberto: discuss crypto related works
Alberto: compare results (speed and size) with alternatives
to see why it is cool stuff; not many scheme have actually been
3https://github.com/asonnino/coconut
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Fig. 5: Overview of th CoCoNut p tition r hit cture.
Similarly to t e pr vious exampl , a set of a t orities in
charge of C runs th C ea e funct on of he CoCoNut libr ry.
T paramet rs n, t ar s t accordingly, and ref poi ts to a
custom function req iri the user to prove in some ways t at
he is a citizen of C. The authoriti s et q = 1, and a ex e ting
to issue a bli and lo - r si ature on the citizen’s private
key k; his signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and e-voting a p gn. Su ces ively, any hird
party create a inst nce of the petition c tract as s own in 5.
The UUID param t r un quely identifies the p ti ion, nd the
scores parameter holds th citizen’s vote (initialized to z ro).
In the case of a peti i n e op ions are only YES and NO; and
the fiel s owner and k respectively hold the public key of the
rd party cre ting the petition and of authorities issuing the
credentia s. I order to sign th petitio , th users c mpute a
value  as follows.
  =
 
gk1
 UUID
Then, they add their vote to the opti ns, append   to a spent
list L, and build a zero-knowledge proof showing that   is
build from the sa e value x of their credential :
  = PK{(k) :   =  gk1 UU D ^   =   k}
Adding   to L prevent a citizen t vote twice during the same
campaign (prevent double spendi g), whil the proof   e sures
that   has been built from a signed pri ate key k.
C. Mapping authorities to blockchain nod s
Alberto: @George, Describe how the CoCoNut authorities
can also be Chainspace nodes (to make clear the potential
of CoCoNut when deeply related to blockchains), since we
actually built all of this to have credentials in smart contracts.
(scores,  ) (1)
V. EVALUATION
A. Primitives evaluati n
The signatur scheme has been implemented in python
using the two crypo libraries p tlib [1] and bplib [2]. The
bilinear pairing works over a Barreto-Naehrig [17] curve, using
Number of measures: 10,000
Operation µ [ms]
 
 2 [ms]
Keygen 2.392 ± 0.006
Sign 0.445 ± 0.001
AggregateSign 0.004 ± 0.000
AggregateKeys 0.017 ± 0.000
Randomize 0.545 ± 0.002
Verify 6.714 ± 0.005
Pr p reBlindSign 2.633 ± 0.003
BlindSign 3.356 ± 0.002
ShowBlindSign 1.388 ± 0.001
BlindVerify 10.497 ± 0.002
AggregateThSign 0.454 ± 0.000
TAB E I: Performances evaluation.
Number of aut orities: n, Signature size: 132 [B]
Transaction complexity size [B]
Signature on clear message:
  ask signature O(n) ||m||
À get signa ure O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) ||m||+ 132
Signature on hidden message:
  ask signature O(n) 516
À get sig ature O(n) 132
Ã verify signature O(1) 355
TABLE II: C mmunication complexity and transaction size.
Ope SSL as the arithmetic backend. We have released the code
as an open-source project on GitHub.3.
Table I shows the mean (µ) an st ndard deviation (
 
 2) of
the execution of h procedure described in section section II.
Each entry is the result of 10,000 measured on an Octa-core
Dell deskt p computer, 3.6GHz Intel Xeon. This table shows
that signing is much fast r than ver fying signatur s (about
15 times faster for the scheme working on clear essages,
and 3 time f ster for the scheme on hidden messages). Also,
aggregation of keys and signa ures are extremely fficient.
Table II shows the communication compl ity and the
size of each xchange involved in the signature scheme, as
presented in fig. 1. The omplexity is xpressed as the number
of sig ing authorities (n), and ||m|| represents th size of
message on which the user wish to obtain a signature. Note
that in practic m is the hash of the actual message, and is
th refore set o 32 byt s (for SHA-2). The siz of a signature is
132 by es. The highest ransaction size appears when the u er
ask a signature on a idden mess ge. This comes from the fact
that the proof  s ssociated with the me sage is approximately
318 by es; t v i nly 157 byte .
Alberto: Upd te the abov
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Figure 5: Overview of th Malet petit on architecture
Bano: Re o this figure as per Ba o’s notes, and the
refer to the steps in write-up.
to itself, and use these ken to steal all the money
in the buffer. Th threshold property of Malet im-
plies that he adv rsary needs to corrup at least t
au horiti fo this attack to happen. This property
also prevents a single authority from taking the user
money and disappear without issuing any token.
  À Ã Õ Œ œ – — “
4.3 Pr va y-prese v ng e-petition and e-
vot g
Bano: Clearly name all the en it es involved in this u e
case. Wh t p perties r expected from this scheme?
In this example, we consider the s enari where a
city C wish t issue some long term credentials o their
citizens in order to al ow any third p rty to organize a
privacy-preserving e-petition or e-voting c mp ign; all
cit zens f C are allow d t p rt cipate, and should re-
main nonymous, a d nlinkable cross campaig s. Thi
system is based on the Malet library contract and sim-
ple smart contract called petition.
Similarly t the previous example, a se of auth rities
in charge of C runs th C eate function of the Malet
library. The parameters n, t re s t accord ly, and re f
point to a custom function requiring the users t prove
in some ways that they are a citizens of C. The authori-
ties s q= 1 Bano: w at is q, a d r expe ting to issu
a blind and long-term signatur on the citizen’s private
key k; this signature acts as the citizen credentials to sign
any e-petition and -voting Bano: state if this may in-
volve che king ome ther information e.g. ssport off-
band, but then how will blindness be maintained?. Suc-
cessively, any third party c eates an instance of the pe-
tition contract as sh wn in fig. 5. The UUID parameter
uniquely identifies the petition, a d the scores parameter
Bano: is this private (can everyone see current scores)?
how are votes with non-binary (yes/no) options repre-
sented? holds the citizen’s votes (initialized to zero). In
the case of a petition the options are only YES and NO;
an the fields owner and vk r spectively hold the v rifi-
cation key of the third party creating the petition and the
verifi atio k y of e authorities issuing the credentials.
In rder to sign a petition, the users compute a value n as
follows:
n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID
Then, they c truc a zero-knowledge pro f showing
that n i build fr t sam value k of their red tials:
p = PK{(k) : n =
⇣
gk1
⌘UUID ^ k = ab k}
Th p ti io sm rt contract checks he p oof p n the
crede tials, and checks that the ote is fresh by verifying
that n is not part of a spent list L; if all the checks pass, it
ad s the vote of the u e s to the list of scores and adds
u to t list L. Adding to L prevents a citizen to vote
twic during the same campaign (prevent double spend-
ing). Also, th proof p ensures that n has been built from
a signed private key k; this means that the users correctly
executed the call ack to prove that they are citizens of C.
Properties brought by Malet. Malet provides a set of
properties that enable the above application when com-
bines.
• Blindness: prevents the authorities from learning
the citizen’s secret key and use it to sign petition
on their be ave. Also, i allows the users to vote
anonymou ly.
• Unlinkability: prevents a party to link citizens’
vote across camp igns. Joining unlinkability with
blindness allows a system where citizens have to go
through the issuance phase only once, and can then
re-use their credentials multiple time while staying
anonymous.
• Threshold: dis ributing the crede tials issuance re-
moves a c ntral authority and prevent a single au-
thority from creating arbitrary credentials to sign
m ltiple ti e a petition.
4.4 Censorship-resistant distribution of
proxies
We i ple ent ship-resistant syst m based on
Mal t. Proxies are often used to circumvent censorship
when the target IP address has been lo ed, but prox-
ies suff r from three limitations. First, proxies tend to
become the target of censorship themselves. For exam-
ple a number of c untries block T r by blacklisting Tor
entry nodes that are publicly known. Second, a censor
can distribute proxies that it controls and pollute the sys-
tem. Third, a censor can pretend to be a user of the
10
create petition happens every 
campaign
h pp ns 
only onc
Figure 2: Coconut Petition Diagra [1]
Platforms/Languages
The main motivation behind using JavaScript for the system was so that the client is able
to locally and trustlessly compute th n cessary crypt gra ic constructs and op r tions
without relying on any 3rd party to do them on their behalf. As well as to b able to
have an appealing graphical user interface. To this end, JavaScript was the most suitable
choice.
The client is implement d through a React web pplication (JavaScript) and the rest
of the entities are implemented through Node.js servers simulations which can be re-
22
placed by something more sophisticated such as a blockchain platform like ChainSpace
(discussed further in Conclusions and Future Directions).
All components are written in the JavaScript implementation of the ECMAScript
2017, or ES8, standard in order to easily write, share, and reuse modules between the
different entities of the system. Then at run-time transpiled to ECMAScript 5, or ES5, in
order to accommodate for browser vendors which are slow to adopt these new language
features.
Cryptography
Regarding the cryptography of the system, the Milagro Crypto JavaScript library[23] is
used for both the client and the servers. Specific components used include the SHA256
hashing algorithm, finite field operations (BIG number types), elliptic curve point types
(ECP and ECP2 types) and their corresponding operations/computations. The setting used
is the Fp254BNb and Fp254n2BNb 256-bit Barreto-Naehrig curves [24] that the authors
of the library implemented using methods presented by Aranha et al[25]. Last but not
least, Milagro’s implementation uses the Marsaglia and Zaman random number genera-
tor[26], and it’s security relies on the being seeded with an external source of entropy. In
this case, we also use JavaScript’s WebCryptoAPI[27].
Communication
The system entities/parties communicate with each other through the Representational
State Transfer (REST) architecture using GET and POST HTTP requests and responses.
One thing to note is that since the cryptographic objects exchanged between parties are
transformed to an array of bytes when sent and then recomposed by the reciever. This is
because, as well as requiring less bandwidth, the cryptographic objects are represented us-
ing the Milagro[23] library types, which have lengthy chains of dependencies, and would
cause issues when attempting to call methods on them due to the effects of serialization
and deserialization.
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Scheme Implementation
The code has been released as open source software on GitHub[28] under the Apache 2.0
license.
Setup
When the setup is initialized, all parties generate their corresponding cryptographic keys/keypairs
along the proper parameters defined above. Note that since the scheme we implement is
and n-out-of-n (as opposed to threshold) for the sake of simplicity, we do not need the
TTPKeyGen step. Then, corresponding parties query the rest of the parties for their re-
spective public keys. An example of the client generating their El-Gamal keypair, as well
as their device keypair (shown in an array of bytes) and querying the rest of the parties for
their public keys is shown in figure 3 below:
Figure 3: Client setup
IssueCred
PrepareBlindSign:
When clients click on the "Sign Credential" button shown below, the PrepareBlind-
Sign algorithm runs as described in the system design and the output Λ is sent to each
of the authorities. However the only added procedure is that the client’s device public
key is added to the input of the hash along with the commitment and is included in the
zero-knowledge proof for obvious security reasons.
As shown below in figure 5 JSON object of 5 elements is sent: pk_cred_bytes, pk_client_bytes,
enc_sk_bytes, requestSig, and proof. As explained above, components being sent are first
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Figure 4: Home page
transformed into an array of bytes. The pk_cred_bytes is the commitment (or public key)
of the secret credential. The pk_client_bytes is the device public key of the client. The
enc_sk_bytes is the El-Gamal encryption of the secret credential. The requestSig is the
ECDSA signature of the client with the client’s device secret key. Finally, the proof is the
output of the zero-knowledge proof pis.
Figure 5: Credential object to be signed by authorities
BlindSign:
When a signing authority gets the POST request from the client, they first check the
validity of the signature. Then they check the validity of the zero-knowledge proof. If
both of these conditions hold, then they sign the credential with their secret keys and send
the partial encrypted credential back to the client.
Figure 6: Blind signing of credential
Unblind:
When the client gets the response from the signing authority, they decrypt it with their
El-Gamal secret key.
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AggCred
Following that, the aggregation of the partial signatures is done by the client in the
browser.
ProveCred
Once the above steps are completed, the "Sign Credential" button turns into a "Randomize
Credential" button as shown below in figure 7.
Figure 7: Client randomize credential
When the button is clicked, it becomes disabled and an input form is added to the
DOM (Document Object Model) which lets the client vote "yes/for" or "no/against" for a
specific petition by clicking either the thumbs up or the thumbs down buttons respectively.
This is shown below in figure 8 They must also input the specific ID of the petition they
would like to vote on. Note that this input petition ID is what is hashed and raised to
power of the secret credential in order to create ζ, which prevents users from voting for
the same petition more than once.
As shown in figure 9, a JSON object of 5 elements is sent: MPCP, MPVP, peitionID,
signature, and votes. As explained above components being sent are first transformed
into an array of bytes. The MPCP (make-proof-credential-petition) is the output of the
zero-knowledge proof piv. The MPVP (make-proof-vote-petition) is the output of the
zero-knowledge proof pip. The peitionID is the Id of the specific petition. The signature
is the client’s randomized signature. Finally, the votes element is the combination of the
encrypted vote and vote inverse.
When getting a success response from the petition owner/creator entity, the button will
show which petition you voted for, thumbs up or down, and the "Randomize Credential"
button will turn back on as shown in figure 10 below.
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Figure 8: Client inputs the petition ID and votes "yes" or "no"
Figure 9: ProveCred and Vote scheme outputs
Figure 10: Client vote
If the client clicks on the "Check Result" button, the client will query the petition
owner for the result of said petition. In the case of the screenshot below, the petition
owner replied that the petition had not yet ended. Also, if the client tried to vote for the
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same petition, the petition owner will know from the repeated value of ζ and prevent them
from voting for the same petition. This is shown in figure 11 below. Note that if the client
tries changing the value of ζ then the proof of knowledge (MPCP) will become invalid
and also prevent them from voting.
Figure 11: Client check result & vote for same petition
Once the petition ends, the petition owner adds all of the votes together homomorphi-
cally and then sends it to one of the decrypting authorities. The authorities will decrypt
the total with their El-Gamal secret key and forward it to the next decrypting authority
until the last authority is reached. Once the total reaches the final authority, they decrypt
it and retrieve the log to get the actual values of the total votes ("yes/for") and total vote
inverses ("no/against"). Finally they send that back to the petition owner who will get the
final results of the specific petition to give to the clients when queried for the result. The
client then simply displays the result of the petition in the form "yes" total -"no" total. The
result is displayed in green if the petition passes, and in red if the petition fails as shown
in figure 12 below.
A very important thing to note here is that this process described is sub-optimal in
terms of security and verifiability since the clients would have to trust the signing author-
ities and the petition owner. It was only done this way for this prototype implementation
for the sake of simplicity. An improved alternative would have for example the client get
the total encrypted votes and then query each decrypting authority one by one themselves
and do the log computation themselves. Another more elegant alternative would be to
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Figure 12: Client check result after petition ends
use a public blockchain for the results which would provide transparency and total public
verifiability, such as the case with the Ethereum implementation of the Open Vote Net-
work[4]. We discuss this in further detail in the final section of Conclusions and Future
Directions.
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Testing and Evaluation
The testing of the system was focused on breaking down the system into smaller parts for
unit testing of specific functions of the system. The unit tests relied on the Mocha[29]
JavaScript test framework as well as the Chai[30] assertion framework that can be paired
with any testing framework. The unit tests were done to guarantee correctness of mainly
the cryptographic constructions and operations without the overhead of the rest of the
system and communications. Note that testing for the client and the servers was the
same as they both relied on the same modules for the cryptographic constructions and
operations.
Performance was measured according to some of the tests created for functionality.
As in the Tangerine system[10] evaluation, each of the system entities were deployed on
fresh 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04 distributions on individual Amazon Web Service EC2 virtual
server micro instances one a device with the following specifications: single core Intel(R)
Xeon(R) E5-2676 v3 @ 2.40GHz[31].
Figure 13 shows the results of expected execution time µ and the corresponding stan-
dard deviation
√
σ2 (in ms) of the main cryptographic operations and constructs used in
the system.
Figure 13: Execution times for cryptographic primitives constructions used in the Tangerine system[10]. Measured over
1,000 runs.
Naturally, the bilinear pairing operation is the most expensive of the cryptographic
operations and constructs, which is the one used for verification. Also, operations in G2
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are twice as expensive as operations in G1 as expected since the constructs are twice as
large. This is why it is important to optimize the system implementation and use the
proper fields where necessary in order not to incur extra unneeded costs, even though in
theory everything could have been done in G2.
Even though communication overhead and latency are somewhat negligible in this
system and on the order of single/couple kiloByte(s) in size and less than 1 millisecond in
delay, they can be optimized further as mentioned in the Tangerine paper[10].
Firstly, the number of authorities present in the system have little to no effect on the
client latency as messages are sent simultaneously to all of the authorities in an asyn-
chronous manner. Furthermore, as shown in the Tangerine implementation[10], increas-
ing the number of clients in the system greatly impacts the performance of the system and
the perceived delay on the side of the client. This stems from the fact that Node.js is not
optimal for heavy computation operations as it is single threaded with an event loop de-
signed for asynchronous, event-driven tasks. However, this is not too much of a concern
in this system as functionality and completeness is much more important than latency for
an e-petition. In addition, the future goal is to replace the back end of the system with
a blockchain based one (as explained in the Conclusions and Future Directions section),
which will definitely introduce new bottlenecks in the system.
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Conclusions and Future Directions
This project entails the implementation of the specific application of an e-petition based
on the Coconut selective credential disclosure scheme. The main distinctive aspect of
this approach is the added feature of unlinkability in addition to anonymity: such that no
information about the anonymous petition voter is linkable back to the individual. In other
words, the only data which would be leaked if at least one authority maliciously leaks it, is
the data concerning who is eligible to vote, as opposed to who actually voted. This should
not happen in the case where all authorities are honest. This censorship resistant property
is very useful and sometimes even vital as is the case with the Barcelona referendum [8].
Signature Petition Scheme
The signature petition scheme described and implemented in this project is not the most
optimal one possible. The way it is done in this project is mainly for simplicity and clarity
purposes especially since the main focus was on the Coconut credential system. It can
easily be modified or even replaced by a more sophisticated/complex or simplified system
based on the specific need.
Coconut Credential Scheme Template
During the implementation, it was evident that the Coconut credential scheme could be
used for numerous different applications, so the implementation bas branched at the stage
where the general Coconut system was ready in order to be used as an open source tem-
plate.
Blockchain Based System
The plan from the start was definitely to implement the system on top of a public, per-
missionless blockchain platform in order to benefit from its security, immutability, and
transparency. Instead of sending information directly to/from the different entities, the
blockchain would basically act as an intermediary where the sender publishes what they
want to send on the blockchain while the receiver waits until this is done and gets the
information off of the blockchain itself. In other words, the blockchain would act as a
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public bulletin board in which the different parties post whatever they would like to send
on to it and the receiving parties get the information directly from the bulletin board. The
receiving party would have to keep monitoring the blockchain to check for anything sent
to them though, or for efficiency, the sender could notify them to check the blockchain
whenever they publish something for example. This is especially valuable in the voting
scheme used for the system because it would eliminate the need to trust the authorities
and the procedure would be transparent and auditable by everyone.
The goal at first was to set up the system to work on top of the permissionless
Chainspace[32] blockchain because it is perfectly suitable for privacy-preserving appli-
cations such as this one. However, unfortunately the Chainspace system is not ready yet
at the time of writing. As for Ethereum[33], the Coconut credential system used here can
actually be used as an add on to the Open Vote Network[4] (or any other Ethereum based
voting system) in order to add the feature of unlinkability to the system.
Hardware Wallet/Device Integration
Another future direction which could be a very interesting project would be to integrate
hardware wallet/device (such as a Trezor[34] or Ledger [35]) functionality in order to
greatly increase security. The users would have to get issued their signed credential from
the authorities on to the hardware wallet/device once at the beginning, to then be able to
randomize and use it numerous times in the future. In the case of the e-petition, the user
would have to go to the authorities in charge of the petition (government body, university
authorities, etc.) to get issued a signed credential from them. Then, whenever they would
like to vote for a petition anonymously/unlinkably, they would need to use their hardware
wallet/device (which stores their private credential) to create the necessary cryptographic
constructs and zero-knowledge proofs in a more secure manner than previously done.
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Appendices
Coconut Generic Scheme
(As in Coconut paper[1])
v Setup(1λ)→ (params): Choose a bilinear group (G1,G2,GT ) with order p, where
p is a λ-bit prime number. Let g1, h1 be generators of G1, and g2 a generator of G2.
The system parameters are params = (G1,G2,GT , p, g1, g2, h1).
v TTPKeyGen(params, t, n)→ (sk, vk): Pick† two polynomials v, w of degree t−1
with coefficients in Fp, and set (x, y) = (v(0), w(0)). Issue to each authority i ∈
[1, . . . , n] a secret key ski = (xi, yi) = (v(i), w(i)), and publish their verification key
vki = (g2, αi, βi) = (g2, g
xi
2 , g
yi
2 ).
v IssueCred(m,φ)→ (σ): Credentials issuance is composed of three algorithms:
v PrepareBlindSign(m,φ)→ (d,Λ, φ): The users generate an El-Gamal key-pair
(d, γ = gd1); pick a random o ∈ Fp, compute the commitment cm and the group
element h ∈ G1 as follows:
cm = g
m
1 h
o
1 and h = H(cm)
Pick a random k ∈ Fp and compute an El-Gamal encryption of m as below:
c = Enc(hm) = (gk1 , γ
khm)
Output (d,Λ = (γ, cm, c, pis), φ), where φ is an application-specific predicate satis-
fied by m, and pis is defined by:
pis = NIZK{(d,m, o, k) : γ = gd1 ∧ cm = gm1 ho1
∧ c = (gk1 , γkhm) ∧ φ(m) = 1}
v BlindSign(ski,Λ, φ) → (σ˜i): The authority i parses Λ = (γ, cm, c, pis), ski =
(x, y), and c = (a, b). Recompute h = H(cm). Verify the proof pis using γ, cm and
†This algorithm can be turned into the KeyGen and AggKey algorithms described in Co-
conut[1] using techniques illustrated by Gennaro et al. [18] or Kate et al. [19].
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φ; if the proof is valid, build c˜ = (ay, hxby) and output σ˜i = (h, c˜); otherwise output
⊥ and stop the protocol.
v Unblind(σ˜i, d) → (σi): The users parse σ˜i = (h, c˜) and c˜ = (a˜, b˜); compute
σi = (h, b˜(a˜)
−d). Output σi.
v AggCred(σ1, . . . , σt)→ (σ): Parse each σi as (h, si) for i ∈ [1, . . . , t]. Output
(h,
∏t
i=1 s
li
i ), where l is the Lagrange coefficient:
li =
 t∏
i=1,j 6=i
(0− j)
 t∏
i=1,sj 6=i
(i− j)
−1 mod p
v ProveCred(vk,m, σ, φ′)→ (Θ, φ′): Parse σ = (h, s) and vk = (g2, α, β). Pick at
random r′, r ∈ F2p; set σ′ = (h′, s′) = (hr
′
, sr
′
); build κ = αβmgr2 and ν = (h
′)r.
Output (Θ = (κ, ν, σ′, piv), φ′), where φ′ is an application-specific predicate satisfied
by m, and piv is:
piv = NIZK{(m, r) : κ = αβmgr2 ∧ ν =
(
h′
)r ∧ φ′(m) = 1}
v VerifyCred(vk,Θ, φ′)→ (true/false): Parse Θ = (κ, ν, σ′, piv) and σ′ = (h′, s′);
verify piv using vk and φ′. Output true if the proof verifies, h′ 6= 1 and e(h′, κ) =
e(s′ν, g2); otherwise output false.
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